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Abstract 
Helped by the growing opening of markets and advances in transport and communication ser-
vices, an export-based economy has been endorsed in many countries for some decades now. To 
this end, one of the tools used is named as ‘Export Processing Zones’, a special arrangement, 
where generous incentives of fiscal and administrative nature are offered to those investing  in 
export oriented products or/and services. From its inception in the early 1960s, the alluring ob-
jectives it promises to achieve and indeed some practical gains it has delivered in areas as job 
creation explains its fast growth, predominantly in developing countries. 
Nonetheless, criticisms against the scheme are also rife. Not only is EPZs’ economic feasibility 
questioned, but also under scrutiny is the quality of labour that it offers. Regarding the latter, it 
is alleged that many aspects of labour conditions in these zones are inferior in comparison to 
similar local firms and that countries are using such lax application of labour protection laws to 
stay competitive in attracting international investors. This triggers a question as to what actions 
are being taken in response to these concerns. As the International Labour Organization, a UN 
agency with a leading role in the global protection of labour, is arguably at the top of its kind to 
look to for some action and guidance, the thesis seeks to inquire what the Organization has been 
up to in this regard. It is within this context that it sets to review some working conditions in 
EPZs, examine the mandate of the ILO in this regard, and track and assess recent developments 
of action from the Organization concerning working conditions in EPZs, with a focus on Free-
dom of Association.  
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1 Chapter One: Introduction  
1.1 Background 
Growing liberalization of economies, fueled by increasing innovation in technology, 
communications and transportation has made international trading easier and faster. 
As such, the size of the trade is enormous and market competition stiff. With the aim to 
boosting their position in the competitive global market, businesses, Multinational En-
terprises (MNEs) in particular, have been relocating their operations to areas that can 
fetch them better outcomes. Similarly, states have been working to attract foreign in-
vestment with a view to creating jobs, increasing exports and thereby obtaining foreign 
earnings, to mention some, by promoting their comparative advantages and offering 
many more incentives. ‘Abundant and cheap’ labour has long been considered as one 
of these advantages.  
To this end, Export Processing Zones (hereinafter EPZs) are among the programs that 
many developing countries have endorsed for the last few decades. These are basically 
arrangements, where governments proffer special package of incentives to lure inves-
tors who are willing to produce mainly export-oriented products/services. Proliferated 
in their current modern forms in the early 1960s, EPZs now account for a good deal of 
share in exports and job creation in an increasing number of countries.  
The growth in these schemes has attracted some academic and policy research works. 
Whereas the majority of the literature focuses on EPZs’ economic feasibilities, there are 
modest studies concerning their social effects, labour conditions being one. In relation 
to the latter, it is common to find reports of inferior labour conditions in these zones 
with Freedom of Association topping the concerns. In response to these claims, the In-
ternational Labour Organization, as a principal actor in the world of work, is the organ 
that one would primarily look for some actions. Accordingly, the need to inquire its 
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legal authority and structural suitability to get involved in light of the reported allega-
tions arises.   
1.2 Research Question(s) 
The central issue of inquiry that the thesis sets to address is: how are labour conditions 
in EPZs placed in the works of the ILO in the last decade, with an emphasis placed on 
Freedom of Association? Of course, in the course of addressing the central question 
identified, some supplementary issues need to be dealt with as well. Included in the list 
will be what labour standards are of most concern in EPZs and  their manifestations;  
whether the ILO has a mandate or/and bear an obligation to engage itself with  work-
ing conditions in EPZs; and what tools can it utilize to carry out the mandate/duty and 
the like. The year 1998 will be taken as a point of departure as it marks some important 
developments of relevance, as will be explained later.   
1.3 Justifications for the Study   
The facts that EPZs are dominated by labour-intensive industries and, thus, host a con-
siderable number of workers; that allegations of inferior labour conditions in these 
zones continue to come out; and that the ILO remains the single most important organ 
in the international regulation of labour primarily justify this study. Related to this, 
significant involvement of multinational corporations in EPZs and the fact that the 
products/services are primarily destined for the global market makes EPZs among the 
scenes that call for international regulation of labor, which, in turn, brings quickly the 
ILO into the spotlight.  
1.4 Methodology  
Primarily, the focus will be to map trends in the works of the ILO concerning working 
conditions in EPZs in the last decade or so along the major functions of the Organiza-
tion.  To this effect, issues of the constitutional mandate of the ILO and discussions on 
  3 
the essence of some of the labor standards raised will necessitate a legalistic approach, 
where the laws and jurisprudence of the ILO will be greatly relied on. Discussions 
about EPZs and tracing developments in the works of the ILO on EPZs, on the other 
hand, will largely draw on literatures, reports and ILO data.  
1.5  Structure of the Thesis  
With a view to addressing the issues identified, the thesis is arranged into four chap-
ters. Following this introductory section, the second chapter briefly introduces Export 
Processing Zones, where some of their salient features, brief historical account, and 
merits and concerns are sketched.  
Having discussed EPZs in general, the third chapter ventures to deal with working 
conditions within these zones. Drawing on various reports, it reviews the implementa-
tion of some labour standards. The selection of the standards follows the trend in the 
relevant studies used, many of them arguably typical standards. Among the standards 
considered, Freedom of Association receives an extended review, mainly due to the 
fact that its implementation in EPZs is of the most concern.    
The fourth chapter assesses how active the ILO has been in addressing working condi-
tions in EPZs, with particular reference to Freedom of Association. After explaining 
why working conditions in EPZs are within the mandates of the ILO, the chapter seeks 
to highlight and map on how, through time, working conditions in EPZs played out in 
the works of the Organization. The search for trend in this regard is made along with 
the three main functions of the Organization, i.e., standard setting, supervision and 
technical cooperation/assistance. Moreover, the indicators used in the assessment in-
clude a number of cases involving working conditions in EPZs and reference to EPZs 
in questionnaire forms according to which state reports are made.  The paper wraps up 
with some concluding remarks.  
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2 Chapter Two: Brief Sketch of Export Processing Zones 
2.1 Describing Export Processing Zones 
The fact that there are many terminologies conveying fairly similar concept has made the need 
to define EPZs all the more clear, but challenging at the same time. For instance, a recent study 
has come up with staggering thirty plus terms for roughly similar establishments and arrange-
ments as used in different countries.
1
 Among the commonly used names are Export Processing 
Zones, Free Trade Zones, Foreign Trade Zones, Free Zone, Special Economic Zones, 
Maquiladors etc.
2
 Of these, the expression ‘Export Processing Zone’ was by far the most com-
mon one some three decades ago and was projected to become a standard term
3
, which nowa-
days seem to be the case given its dominant use in literature
4
 and ILO reports.      
Below, some of the definitions offered are presented. In one of the early studies on the subject 
under the auspices of the ILO and UN Center on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), EPZ 
refers to:  
a clearly delineated industrial estate which constitutes a free trade enclave in the customs 
and trade regime of a country and where foreign manufacturing firms producing mainly 
for export benefit from a certain number of fiscal and financial incentives.
5
   
In a similar tone, but with some additional specificity, the World Bank defines EPZ as “an 
industrial estate, usually a fenced-in area of 10 to 300 hectares that specializes in manufactur-
ing for export.”6 It then goes on to list some common incentives these zones usually offer to 
the investors therein.  
                                                 
 
1
 Boyenge (2007) 
2
 ILO/UNCTC(1988), p.4 
3
 Ibid. p.4 
4
 Jayanthaumaran (2003) p.52 
5
 ILO/UNCTC (1988) p.4  
6
 World Bank (1992) p.7 
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What stands out in both definitions is that an EPZ is a physically secluded, distinguishable 
enclave where goods/services are produced mainly for export. Besides, the definitions attest 
that the provision of various incentives for investors is a defining feature of EPZs. Moreover, 
manufacturing firms working in EPZs are foreigners as per the first definition. Some of these 
components seem to have some shortcomings when tested against current prevailing under-
standing and use of the term. The main difficulty pertains to the physical nature of EPZs por-
trayed. EPZs, in the first definition, are depicted as being fenced in and secluded areas. Such 
an understanding only represents some segment of present day EPZs and is thus narrow.
7
 In 
this regard, the qualification that this state of things is only the ‘usual’ one, as hinted in the 
second definition, is appropriate. Similarly, the description of EPZs in one of the above defi-
nitions as being reserved for foreign investors is an excessive generalization in that modest 
participation of domestic investors is also allowed in many EPZs, although the dominant vis-
ibility of foreign firms is undeniable.
8
 
This said, the ILO has devised its own definition according to which its widely used data is 
collected. Accordingly, EPZs are “industrial zones with special incentives set up to attract 
foreign investors, in which imported materials undergo some degree of processing before 
being exported again.”9 The main difference of such a description from the above definitions 
is that it does not claim EPZs to be designated and geographically secluded areas. Indeed, a 
single standalone company located anywhere in a country may work under an EPZ status 
provided it satisfies some specific requirements as is the case in Namibia.
10
 Thus, the expres-
sion EPZ, currently, refers both to the physical structure, where various industries produce 
goods and services mainly for export as well as to a special program or, to use Madani’s ex-
pression, a trade policy instrument
11
, under which industries anywhere in a country work.  
Yet, the ILO description, too, suffers from some crucial flaws. Among others, it does not 
exactly encapsulate the nature of various types of establishments that the ILO, in its own sur-
                                                 
 
7
 Ibid. p.3 
8
 Gordon (2000) p.66  
9
ILO (1998a)  p. 3 
10
 Endresen (2001) p.14 
11
 Madani (1999) p.11 
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veys, considers as EPZs. For instance, in some EPZs, the input materials are obtained locally 
and in some other zones, a certain percentage of finished goods or/and services might be sold 
domestically.
12
 Still, unlike what the definition suggests, it is not necessary that only foreign 
investors are involved in operating EPZs, as will also be shown later. In addition, it can be 
argued that the ‘special incentives’ mentioned under the definition are too broad to inform 
the modality and scope to enable us determine if a certain firm/industry is to be regarded as 
working under EPZ status and thus be subject to some regulatory interventions. Related to 
this, the definition also falls short of informing us the comparator. In other words, it is not 
clear if the incentives should discriminate between firms engaged in the same sector or it is 
sufficient for the incentives to pertain to some firms in the country and not others irrespective 
of the sector.   
In light of these shortcomings, it appears to me that the definition is too loose to have a defin-
itive meaning with a normative effect to guide actions. This is especially so, for instance, if 
we were to use it in a future legal standard specifically regulating working conditions in 
EPZs, in which case the definition adopted would ultimately determine the scope of the 
standard.   
However, given the fact that this paper aims at examining the working conditions in EPZs 
and ILO intervention in this regard, it is only logical to mainly follow the ILO’s wider under-
standing as a working definition, with my reservations in mind. Thus, EPZs, in this paper, 
encompass different forms of arrangements, where firms, be those working under a fenced in 
complex or not, run mainly export oriented production under significantly preferable terms, 
compared to the rest of the economy.   
In line with this and in the face of the difficulties concerning the definition, it is deemed impera-
tive to briefly look at some common features of EPZs that are usually agreed upon. Drawing on 
relevant literatures and ILO reports, three features of EPZs stand out and are discussed below. 
                                                 
 
12
Ibid. p.15 
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2.1.1 Export Oriented Production 
As the name evidently tells, EPZs host industries that produce mainly export-oriented 
goods/services. From the very start, EPZs were one of the primary choices when many states 
opted for an outward oriented economic policy.
13
 Hence, their contribution to the total ex-
ports in many hosting states has been visible throughout. For instance, a report shows that 
from 2002-2006 EPZs’ export shares continued to account for 80% and more of the national 
export in many of the countries surveyed though in some countries, like Cameron, the share 
was only around 32%.
14
  
This being the prevailing fact, there are some exceptions to it. For instance, Brazil’s Manuas 
EPZ is a good example. This zone was established with the main purpose of importing semi 
finished goods and transforming them for subsequent sale in the domestic market.
15
 For this 
reason, it has been labeled by some as ‘import processing zone’ instead.16 Besides, the Do-
minican Republic and Mexico allow up to 20% and 20-40% respectively of the EPZ products 
into their domestic markets.
17
  
2.1.2 Generous Incentives  
The wide range of incentives granted to EPZs investors is the other typical characteristics of 
the same. Though the types and extent (duration) of the incentives vary among countries, the 
ILO identified long list of them, including total or partial exemption of both export and im-
port customs; exemption from direct and indirect taxes on profits, property tax and VAT; 
exemption from national foreign exchange controls; and free profit repatriation for foreign 
companies.
18
 Added to the list are free provision of enhanced physical infrastructure and 
streamlined administrative services.
19
 Furthermore, better possibility of foreign ownership of 
businesses; relaxed enforcement of labour and environmental laws and regulations; and privi-
                                                 
 
13
 Krueger (1980) p.288 
14
 Milberg (2008) pp.8-9  
15
 ILO/UNTCT (1988) pp.46-47  
16
 Ibid. p.46  
17
 Madani (1999) p.16  
18
 Milberg (2008) p.1  
19
 Ibid.  
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leged rules on the lease or purchase of land are additional incentives that host states usually 
offer to EPZ investors.
20
0 Given the wide array of incentives used, L. Farole’s description of 
such zones as areas where ‘…the rules of business are different from those that prevail in the 
national territory’21 better catches the reality. As can be seen from the list, relaxing rules on 
labour has been one of the ‘incentives’ that states intentionally offer to potential investors in 
their EPZs, an issue of central importance to the thesis 
Such policy of deep concessions from hosting states is said to be in response to, or at least 
matches, demands from investors. Related to this, studies in the 1970s and 1980s reveal that 
labor costs play a fundamental role in any policy for the redeployment of industrial activities 
in EPZs.
22
 Suffices to state here that this phenomenon highlights the legitimacy of labour 
conditions concerns in these zones, and hence the need to examine developments in this re-
gard. 
Before wrapping the section, it is worth to note that EPZ investment is also induced by other 
factors of production on which the host country has comparative advantages, including natu-
ral resources and its location. Regarding location, market access plays a central place for in-
vestors.
23
 This may relate to the proximity of the host state to a potential market/customers or 
beneficial trade arrangements that the host country is a party to, as exemplified by the North 
American Free Trade Agreement /NAFTA/ or the Multifiber Agreement.
24
 Other important 
considerations for investing in EPZs, obviously, include sound governance and size of the 
economy,
25
 among others. 
2.1.3 Labour Intensive Industries 
The last, and equally important, marking feature of EPZs is that they are clearly dominated 
by labor-intensive industries. Indeed, job creation is one of the key stated objectives of 
                                                 
 
20
 Engman (2007) p. 17. Country specific incentives can be found at Endresen  (2001) p.27  
21
 Farole (2011) p.23  
22
 Gordon (2000) p.67 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid. p.68  
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EPZs.
26
 As such, despite contentions revolving around its quality, the sheer number of jobs 
created by EPZ is, usually, considered as one of their successes.
27
 Related to this, ILO compi-
lations reveal that there are 130 countries operating some 3500 EPZs, employing 66 million 
people, China being the major country in the expansion of EPZs activities and jobs created.
28
 
Labour intensive sectors like textile, clothing and electronics dominant many EPZs
29
 to the 
extent that in Mauritius 94% of its EPZ workers are in the apparel sector.
30
 This is still so 
even if their share has been on the decline due to the diversification of industries. For in-
stance, in Jamaica and Barbados services like data entry and processing are common EPZ 
activities.
31
 Similarly, Indian EPZs have also extended their production of leather, food and 
electronic software apart from the dominant textile sector.
32
    
Besides the facts that apparel industry a labour intensive one and that its produces are easier 
to transport might explain why it has dominated EPZs activities, the Multifiber Agreement 
(MFA), which regulated trading of apparel products till 1995,
33
 is considered as the other 
important reason for their boom in the 1970s.
34
  
2.2 Historical Background and Development of EPZs 
Though similar establishments can be traced as back as the time of Roman Empire,
35
 the Shan-
non Free Zone of Ireland is widely credited to be the first modern EPZ.
36
 The advent of jet air-
liner which, unlike it predecessor, no longer needed to refuel on the transatlantic flight (in Ire-
land) led to the pressing decline of the Shannon International Airport.
37
 In order to rescue jobs 
and give life to the airport and the national airline, the Irish authorities established a free zone 
                                                 
 
26
 Milberg (2008) p.8 
27
 Gordon (2000) pp.68-69  
28
 Milberg (2008) p.4 
29
Kreye (1987) p.14 
30
Milberg (2008) p.10  
31
Gordon (2000) pp.66-67 
32
 Milberg (2008) p.10  
33
 Naumann (2006)  p.5 
34
 Banda (2007) p. 31 
35
 ILO/UNTCT (1988) p.1 
36
 Engman (2007) p.11. See also World Bank (1992) p.25, Gordon (2000) p.63 
37
 ILO/UNTCT (1988) p.1 
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around the airport with incentives to attract foreign investors who could produce industrial 
products of high values destined for export.
38
 By and large, this innovative venture was success-
ful in creating jobs and sustaining the airport and the airlines and, most importantly, in its im-
pact on others.
39
  
In 1965, Taiwan became the first developing country to establish an EPZ and served as a model 
to other Asian developing countries.
40
 Mexico and Poland followed suit from up north.
41
 Many 
African countries embraced EPZs relatively late but “count for much of the recent increase in 
the number globally.”42 Now, a commonplace nearly everywhere, with the developing countries 
dominating, EPZs have grown in number, size, as well as scope of industries they comprise.
43
 
Increased interest on the area has led the UN to the establish the World Economic Processing 
Zones Association that consists of governments experienced in the development such zones in 
1978.
44
 Reorganized as an independent, private non-profit organization since 1985, it aims at, 
among others, exchanging information, recruiting and training EPZ management, researching on 
trade and marketing, and representing EPZs’ interests before international bodies.45 In passing, 
seeing the website that the organization currently runs, however, reveals that it is not really liv-
ing up to the expectation, unfortunately.   
This said, it is also imperative to note some changes that EPZs have undergone through time. In 
form, EPZs grew from their early fenced-in constellation of firms to include single indus-
try/company
46
 and an entire city/island as in the case of Mauritius
47
 and Guangdong and Fujian 
provinces in China.
48
 In others words, unlike in its early stage, currently, EPZ(s) refers to a sta-
tus as much as the physical complex. Pertaining to changes in activities, as the the ILO aptly 
                                                 
 
38
 Ibid. p.1 
39
 Ibid. pp.1-2 
40
 Gordon (2000) p.63 
41
 Ibid. p.63 
42
 Endresen (2001) p.15 
43
 ILO/UNTCT (1988) p.2 
44
 WEPZA, available at http://www.wepza.org/ 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 Milberg (2008) p.2 
47
Ibid.  p.15 
48
 McCallum (2011) p.6  
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noted, “EPZs have evolved from initial assembly and simple processing to include high tech and 
science parks, finance zones, logistic centers and even tourist resorts.”49  
2.3 Rationale: Arguments For and Against EPZs 
The common objectives governments hope to achieve in promoting EPZs is succinctly put by 
Romero as follows:  
Job creation, skill formation, the location of industry in depressed regions as well as a 
desire to boost foreign- exchange earnings, foreign direct investment (FDI) and export-
led industrialization, have been the main considerations motivating governments to 
promote EPZs.
50
 
Some supplementary goals of EPZs can also be identified. For instance, Chinese EPZs were 
established in the socialist country with an explicit purpose of serving as “laboratories for exper-
iments, where western technology and managerial methods carried out, while China itself simul-
taneously retained its socialist domestic economy.”51 In Thailand, moving industries out of 
Bangkok to overcome problems of congestion and pollution was one of the central objectives of 
the EPZs project.
52
  
In line with these noble objectives, many EPZ specific studies indicate some success stories, 
direct and indirect employment creation and contribution to host countries’ foreign earning by 
boosting exports being the usual gains topping the list.
53
 These, indeed, have been the justifica-
tion for the growth and diversification of EPZs.  
On the other hand, there is growing dissatisfaction with EPZs, which often come in two ways. 
The first trend of criticism takes the form of discrediting the alleged gains of EPZs and second 
one highlights more socioeconomic downsides of the same, including labour conditions, as will 
                                                 
 
49
 Milberg (2008) p.2 
50
 Romero (1995) p.248  
51
 Yuan (1992) p.1036. Chinese EPZs are also known for their diversity in type and sheer size that prompting many 
relevant ILO surveys to do a special entry 
52
 Engman (2007) p.16 
53
 Milberg (2008) p.11 
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be discussed in subsequent chapters. On the former, one of the challenges has to do with the way 
the figures that support EPZ success stories is acquired. In relation to this, most cost benefit 
analysis studies are accused of being confined only to the economic analysis of EPZs and thus do 
not give a holistic picture.
54
 For instance, Endresen and Jauch wonder how the cost of the deteri-
orating health of workers due to harsh working conditions could be included while computing 
costs.
55
 The complaint here is that positive assessment of EPZs usually relies on supporting fac-
tors and excludes those that may negate results or taint the image. Besides, “counterfactual is not 
clear” as the OECD would put it, meaning that even if, for instance, exports and/or employment 
increase after the establishment of an EPZ is shown, this does not necessarily signify a cause and 
effect.
56
 Moreover, some claim that some seemingly successful EPZs are only showcases heavily 
subsidized by the rest of the economy.
57
 This is in reference to the direct and indirect costs that 
host countries incur to establish and subsidize zones as well as the forgone revenues resulting 
from extended tax exemptions. Sometimes, their economic worthiness is questioned. Backing 
this up, the World Bank, in its 1992 report estimated that only 40-50% of EPZs were successful, 
whereas 20-30% moderately successful and 30% unsuccessful.
58
  
Catalyst effect on the domestic economy through forward and backward linkage, being the other 
objective of EPZs, this, too, does not escape scrutiny in its implementation. It is argued that as 
EPZ investors, typically big multinationals, often have an already established partnership with 
qualified international input providers, they are less likely to use from the local economy, as 
hosting countries would hope.
59
 In a similar token, technological spillover to the domestic econ-
omy has also been negligible due, mainly, to the fact that EPZ production has been low skill in-
tensive for long time and that “[t]he technology is embodied in imported capital and the 
knowledge is embodied in the management staff.”60 Lastly, the ease in repatriating profits from 
                                                 
 
54
 Gordon (2000) p.68 
55
 Endresen (2001) pp.31-32  
56
 Engman (2007)  p.23  
57
 Endresen (2001) p.31  
58
 World Bank (1992)  p..3 
59
 Milberg (2008) pp. 20-21  
60
 Ibid. p.21   
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EPZ operations undermines a core stated objective of EPZs, i.e., earning hard currencies to host 
countries,
61
  adding yet another source of skepticism for opponents. 
Somehow related to this, it is worth to note that global financial institutions like the World Bank, 
the WTO system and regional trade arrangements have also been careful in supporting EPZs. 
The World Bank has long maintained that EPZs are only the second best policy to structural re-
form.
62
 Its cautious support, which was premised on the hope that EPZs would lead to progres-
sive liberalization of the economy, is still half hearted, as many EPZs are being used to indefi-
nitely delay economy wide reforms.
63
 Similarly, the WTO trading system is also pressing against 
the incentive part of EPZs as it might amount to subsidy that contradicts many of its rules, nota-
bly the principle of equal treatment.
64
 For similar reasons, the growing regional trade agreements 
are also putting more pressure on EPZs by primarily pushing for the exclusion of subsidies in 
EPZs.
65
   
To sum up, the many voices of concern suggests that EPZs are not living up to the multifaceted 
objectives that they promise to offer. However alluring their objectives might be, implementation 
seems to be far from ideal. Despite these challenges, however, many states have kept their exist-
ing EPZs; others are expanding, and still some are joining the rank.
66
 Researches strongly sug-
gest that EPZs are on the increase. It appears that for hosting countries, the actual or perceived 
positive contributions of EPZs out weight the drawbacks. Incidentally, this fact also means that 
researches into the area, like this thesis, remain relevant.       
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3 Chapter Three: ILO Labour Standards and EPZs 
3.1 Justifying the Inquiry 
Having introduced the overall description of EPZs, this chapter sets to review the trend of labour 
conditions in these zones as documented in various studies. Before venturing to the main issue, 
though, a brief justification for the inquiry, some relevant methodological issues, and clarifica-
tion of terms that recur throughout the chapter and indeed the thesis, would open the chapter.  
To begin with, we ask why labour conditions in EPZs is an issue. As hinted above in passing, 
the query into the labour conditions in EPZs is justified on some accounts. First and foremost, 
reports of poor labour conditions that are specific to the nature of EPZs keep coming out, as will 
be discussed latter. Second, the fact that EPZs usually host labour intensive industries and hence 
employ a large number of people makes them a legitimate spot of concern regarding their labour 
conditions. In other words, to borrow the expression from the ILO, “labour costs [is] a large 
component of total costs”67 leading for companies to see labour as a cost to contain.68 Related to 
this, the fact that EPZ production is principally destined to the competitive international market 
reinforces the motive to contain labour costs so as to stay competitive. In addition, Romero con-
tends that the frequent occurrence of fatal industrial accidents has cast further suspicion on EPZs 
and thus warranted for a critical look at their labour conditions.
69
 These reasons, I believe, suf-
fice to make the inquiry a worthwhile.   
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3.2 Labour Standards, Labour Conditions, and Labour Rights: Clarification 
It is common to come across expressions including ‘labour standards’, ‘labour conditions’ and 
‘labour rights’ being used interchangeably.70 Some clarification will, therefore, be helpful in the 
interest of consistent use.  
Accordingly, the ILO thesaurus, which is used for indexing and retrieval by the its various or-
gans, defines labour standard as “standards concerning employment and working conditions 
found acceptable by employers and workers through collective bargaining and by the legislator 
through labour laws and regulations.”71 Similarly, a prolific writer on the area describes labor 
standards as actual or proposed legal requirements whereas ‘labour conditions’ refer to the ‘ac-
tual working conditions’.72 In other words, while labour standards refer to the legal norms 
providing for minimum requirements,
73
 ‘labour conditions’ signify the actual implementation of 
these requirements.  
In line with this and within the context of the ILO, the main source of labour standards at a 
global level, ‘ILO labour standards’ mainly refer to all the positive laws regulating labour as 
contained in its Constitution, conventions, recommendations, declarations and protocols. The 
Organization, the only organ to outlive the defunct League of Nations, has been producing a 
great deal of such standards ever since its establishment as part of the treaty of Versailles in 
1919. Accordingly, the ILO has thus far adopted 189 conventions, 202 recommendations, with 
some of them revised and others rendered outdated,
74
 some protocols and declarations. The sub-
ject matters covered are also so pervasive, stretching from employment policy to labour admin-
istration; from those covering all employees to those pertaining only to specific category of 
workers like those working in road transport, seafaring, glass making e.t.c.
75
.  
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This said, the third related idiom, ‘labour rights’, is usually used in such a way to reflect enti-
tlements by the working people in its abstract form and bears with it a universal claim. Instances 
include the four right and principles the 1998 Declaration provides. This being the common un-
derstanding, it sometimes is also used to refer to those standards of general nature that do not 
bear direct economic outcomes.
76
   
Hence, in this thesis ‘labour standards’ refers to the detailed instruments that the ILO has adopt-
ed, whereas ‘labour condition’ captures what is happening in the actual implementation of these 
standards and ‘labour rights’ is used when these standards or some of them are presented in the 
sense we use human rights – universally claimable entitlements to every worker or to workers of 
a particular industry/category. Taking Freedom of Association, in labour relations context, as an 
instance, the different relevant ILO instruments including Convention Nos. 87, 98, 154 would 
constitute the labour standards, whereas ‘Freedom of Association’ as a generic right emanating 
from these instruments would be an example of a labour right. The way these standards are be-
ing implemented, such as the unionization rate in a certain setting, on the other hand, represent a 
labour condition. 
3.3 Some Methodological Issues: Reliability, Representation and 
Comparator 
Applying secondhand studies of labour conditions in EPZs necessitates clarifying some meth-
odological issues and perspectives, which may affect the validity of assessments and thus need 
to be born in mind. Three issues are identified in this regard, i.e., reliability and representative-
ness of study reports used and the comparator taken in assessing labour conditions in EPZs. To 
begin with, many of the reports available are produced or sponsored by various individuals and 
institutions and thus the possibility of partiality in these studies cannot be ruled out. For in-
stance, it is not difficult to observe a notable difference in tone in the reports of the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and that of the World Bank on similar findings. 
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The second issue to note is that many of the data used in these studies might be far from reflect-
ing the actual situation across the board for various reasons.
77
  
Furthermore, researchers take different positions about the point of reference in assessing labour 
conditions in EPZs.
78
 In other words, there are differences as to what threshold to use against 
which labour conditions in EPZs should be tested. In this regard, two trends stand out. The first 
being to compare EPZ labour conditions with that of a comparable firm/s in the host country, 
the alternative is to instead use comparable firms in industrialized countries as a comparator.
79
 
The principal limitation with the first option is that there might not be comparable local firms to 
weigh against. For instance, this is the case where an entire island works under an EPZ status. 
As to the second option, it is convincingly argued that given “the large difference in per capita 
income, work patterns and alternative employment opportunities” taking firms in industrialized 
countries as comparators is unreasonable.
80
  
This said, it can be safely concluded that in the  great majority of studies, the comparison is be-
tween working conditions in EPZs and that of similar domestic firms with no zone status. I be-
lieve the approach is a better choice. Not only does it admit the obvious difference of working 
conditions in different countries, it also rightly points to the ‘special incentive’ that  EPZs re-
ceive unlike the remaining economy. Yet, some of its limitations should be conceded, including 
the difficulty of finding suitable representative local industries and the fact that the choice might 
amount to conceding to or, even worse, perpetuating inferior labour conditions, which is the 
case in most developing countries where EPZs are situated. 
With this, we now turn to review what studies suggest about some labour conditions in EPZs. 
The choice of the limited number of the labour conditions discussed below is made in line with 
many of the studies consulted. It is worth noting from the outset that the legal bases and con-
tours of the labour standards picked, except for Freedom of Association, are not discussed in the 
interest of space. 
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3.4 Review of Some Labour Conditions in EPZs 
3.4.1 Wage  
It appears the majority of studies assert that EPZ firms usually pay higher wages than their com-
parable domestic sectors outside the zones. Studies by Romero, the OECD, and the World Bank, 
among others, suggest that the wage level in EPZs in general is above the average market out-
side the zones.
81
 For instance, EPZs in the Caribbean and Central America paid 5-20 % higher 
salaries than other domestic firms and in Malaysia the increase went up to 30%.
82
 A recent ILO 
study, which encompassed some of the major EPZ hosting countries, also strengthens the 
trend.
83
 This being the dominant observation, some writers are skeptical as to why pay is higher 
in EPZs than in firms with no zone status. On this, Romero argues that higher productivity and 
payments for overtime works, a common scenario in EPZs, partly explain the seemingly higher 
wages.
84
 In addition, the “perceived need to pay a wage premium to attract workers to EPZ 
companies with a reputation for harsh working conditions”85 is cited as an additional pressure 
behind the better wage.  
3.4.2 Discrimination against Female Workers 
Discrimination against female workers has been the other major area of study in relation to 
EPZs. Female workers constitute the majority of workforce since early times of EPZs.
86
 For 
instance, they make up to 90 percent of EPZ workers in Jamaica and Nicaragua, and account for 
85 percent in Bangladesh and in Madagascar, they represent 75 percent of EPZ workforce.
87
 
Such a dominant presence means that the general conditions of work in EPZs have particularly 
strong relevance to female workers.  
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Various theories are advanced to explain the ‘feminization’88 of employment in these zones. 
Among others, it is argued that female workers are chosen because “…they are cheaper to em-
ploy, less likely to unionize, and have greater patience for the tedious, monotonous work em-
ployed in assembly operations.”89 In addition, perceptions that they are “hard working, easy to 
control and have nimble fingers”90 are also cited as reasons. The less likelihood of them joining 
unions usually has to do with their family responsibilities.  
The ILO has observed that women are often paid lower wages than men in EPZs.
91
 For instance, 
in Bangladesh EPZs there are clear discriminatory practices against female workers in assigning 
them to lower posts even if they are as well equipped as the men workers.
92
 Besides, it was also 
found out that women workers are paid lower while they are performing the same task as their 
men colleagues.
93
 Similarly, ICFTU alleges that mandatory pregnancy test is a commonplace in 
the maquilas of Mexico, which usually results in denial of employment or mandatory resigna-
tion.
94
 Employers’ reluctance to invest in the training of female workers and absence of facili-
ties, which take into account specific needs of women’s health, are also sources of complaints.95  
Some, however, are less cynical as to why female workers are paid lower. According to 
Romero, for instance, this appears to result from “gender-based biases with respect to the re-
cruitment and promotion of staff,” where employers tend to hire men for technical and manage-
rial posts whereas female workers are assigned to production lines and thus earn lower pay-
ment.
96
 Leaving the motives of EPZ employers in hiring female workers aside, how do female 
workers fare in EPZs?     
Lastly, the gloomy working conditions for female workers in EPZs being a source for concern, 
we are reminded that women are “…the unintended beneficiaries of the formation of EPZs, 
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since many might not have sought formal market employment were it not for them.”97 However, 
it does not take a genius to note that the creation of employment for women, though to be wel-
comed, by no means justifies inferior labour conditions.  
3.4.3 Occupational Safety and Health Conditions    
The other working condition, which is often taken up for assessment in EPZs is occupational 
safety and health conditions in relation to which these zones score mixed assessment as com-
pared to similar local firms. Some claim that the performance of EPZ firms in this regard vary 
depending on the regulatory framework in the host country, the size, age and type of industry, 
and company policy, among other things.
98
 For instance, it is argued that bigger firms with larg-
er-scale operations usually provide better safety measures compared to smaller firms.
99
 In terms 
of sectors, the garment and electronics industries are more vulnerable to occupational hazards 
than others.
100
  
 
Tragic accidents, which claimed heavy death tolls from fire, suicides and respiratory problems 
in EPZ and other firms alike, have been brought to public attention. However, the fact that la-
bour inspection is particularly rendered difficult in EPZs means that the problem is worse in 
these zones.
101
 Yet, the fact that big multinationals with better expertise dominate EPZs firms 
seem to give them some leverage to set the deficit off. Reflecting the mixed performance, the 
ILO would state, “[N]o statistics are available to show whether occupational accidents or dis-
eases are more or less frequent in EPZs than in other enterprises.”102  
3.4.4 Working Hours  
Working hours is yet another labour standard in relation to which comparison between EPZs 
and other domestic firms is frequent. An earlier study, which assessed EPZs in 14 major EPZs 
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hosting countries, admitted that working hours is one of the principal areas on which EPZs are 
severely criticized.
103
 It, however, argued that the composition of workers, i.e., predominantly 
young women, is causing the problem to be on the spotlight and not “because of inherently more 
adversarial labour relations.”104 
There seems to be a solid finding that shows that excessive working hours is rather more com-
mon in EPZs, compared to other local firms. For instance, Romero observed that long hours of 
work, mainly through overtime, is a problem in many zones.
105
 The same conclusion is reached 
in a recent study conducted under the auspices of the ILO.
106
 Accordingly, a survey of EPZs in 
Sri Lanka, Madagascar, and China reveals that zones do require overtime works exceeding the 
legal limits.
107
 Moreover, ICFTU has published more damning reports of mandatory and exces-
sive overtime works in some EPZs located in Lesotho, Madagascar, China and Taiwan.
108
 
The principal factor explaining such longer working hours has to do with the nature of many 
EPZ industries, which have rigid shipping deadlines
109
and usually set unrealistically high pro-
duction targets.
110
 This said, an important cautionary remark is in order concerning the delicate 
nature of overtime work. It is asserted that the excessive overtime work might not always be 
blamed on employers as workers are sometimes eager to do more overtime jobs and indeed 
complain of favoritism in allotment.
111
  
In addition to the above labour conditions, lack of opportunity for career development
112
 is the 
other concern that EPZs are associated with and can be attributed to various factors. Among 
others, due to deplorable working conditions labour turn-over is very high in many EPZs.
113
 For 
instance, a study on Mexican EPZs found out that due to such conditions, only 40% of the 
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workers stay more than three months in their job.
114
 Related to this, researches show that in 
many EPZs short-term contracts are used to facilitate flexible hiring and firing and in order to 
avoid costs such as maternity and redundancy pay
115
 and thus an infringement on workers’ ca-
reer development. Lastly, career development of workers is compromised, since the production 
process in the majority of EPZ is a low-tech one. Meaning, workers’ productivity stagnates after 
acquiring the required skills as higher technology is less likely to come in,
116
 at least until re-
cently.   
3.5 Freedom of Association and EPZs 
3.5.1 Freedom of Association: General 
This section discusses Freedom of Association and its implementation in EPZs in a relatively 
detailed manner. The emphasis on this particular labour right can be justified on the following 
accounts. Firstly, it forms part of the four core labour rights and principles that the ILO identi-
fied in its 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.
117
 The Declaration, 
with its own Follow-Up, dictates that “...[M]embers, even if they have not ratified the Conven-
tions in question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of membership in the Organiza-
tion to respect, to promote and to realize…”118 the rights and principles identified. Indeed, the 
special role of unionization for the protection of other rights has led the ILO to adopt a special 
supervisory mechanism for it unlike any other standard, as discussed below. Such an elevated 
status of the standard would, therefore, partly justify the selection. Secondly and related to the 
first, even if the four core standards have a lot in common, it is asserted that infringements on 
Freedom of Association is more common than the others.
119
 Lastly and most importantly, the 
implementation of the freedom is a far more vivid concern in EPZs as various studies reveal.
120
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The notion, Freedom of Association, is visible in both typical human rights discourses and the 
field of industrial relations.
121
 In relation to the first, it suffices to mention that it, often coupled 
with freedom of assembly, is to be found in all core international human rights instruments, al-
beit some differences in scope. Indeed, in the words of the US Supreme Court, the freedom, 
deriving its validity from the First Amendment,
122
 is “…closely allied to freedom of speech and 
a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society.”123  
 
In the sphere of labour relations, Freedom of Association, which applies to both workers and 
employers, is considered to be among the most important labour rights, and yet at the same time 
the most controversial one.
124
 Its importance lies in its contribution for the enjoyment of other 
rights by strengthening the right holders’ bargaining power in advancing their respective inter-
ests.
125
  
 
An important right as it is, Freedom of Association is also fraught with controversy. Among 
others, it shares many of the theoretical objections advanced against the catalogue of socio-
economic rights as the freedom, in the context of industrial relations, is usually characterized as 
such.
126
 Apart from this, its alleged incompatibility with personal liberty in general and freedom 
of contract in particular by distorting the market relations between employees and employers 
poses a strong challenge.
127
  In line with this, some argue that Freedom of Association is likely 
to set an above-market wage by unduly favouring workers.
128
 As a result, a sort of compromise 
is readable in its current status. Accordingly, even if the right has long been considered as a pil-
lar labour right, its details lack consensus. 
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3.5.2 Freedom of Association and the ILO 
Freedom of Association is prominently placed in both legal and institutional settings of the ILO. 
To begin with, it is identified as one of the standards that need an urgent improvement in the 
very preamble to the ILO Constitution,
129
 and is among the few principles on which the Organi-
zation is based.
130
 Furthermore, as just hinted above, the 1998 Declaration upholds the freedom 
to be one of the four fundamental rights and principles. Institutionally, it commands a unique 
and permanent supervisory mechanism that does not feature on other standards. Thus, the 
Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA or the Committee hereinafter) was established in 
1951 for the purpose of examining complaints about violations of Freedom of Association, 
whether or not the country concerned had ratified the relevant conventions.
131
 Notwithstanding 
the lack of constitutional basis, the Committee has successfully claimed jurisdiction on all ILO 
members by reading the Constitution and the appended Philadelphia Declaration of 1944 to that 
effect.
132
  
 
What then are the salient features of Freedom of Association? Among the host of relevant ILO 
instruments, two conventions namely, Conventions No. 87 and No. 98, as clarified over the 
years, take central place in defining the contours of Freedom of Association. Speaking of clarifi-
cation, the works of ILO supervisory organs standout even though the International Court of 
Justice is the only organ invested to provide authoritative interpretation of the ILO Constitution 
and conventions as per Art.37(1) of the Constitution.
133
 In this regard, the role of the Committee 
of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations and the CFA, with a very 
broad convergence of views,
134
  is visible. This notwithstanding, the facts that the CFA is a tri-
partite organ and is specifically tasked with handling complaints solely on Freedom of Associa-
tion puts it in a better position to do the job better and thus more attention is attached to its deci-
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sions that it periodically publishes as a digest. As a result, the last digest that came out in 2006, 
is heavily used in discussing the salient features of the right below. 
3.5.3 Freedom of Association: Major Constituents 
To begin with, the freedom extends to workers and employers alike in both their individual ca-
pacity and collectively. It is usually treated as constituting three interrelated themes, namely 
right to organize, collective bargaining and the right to strike,
135
 as briefly discussed below. 
3.5.3.1 Right to Organize 
Freedom of Association primarily recognizes the right of both workers and employers, without 
distinction whatsoever, to join organizations of their choosing without previous authorization.
136
 
This right not only enables the right holders to join an already established organization but also 
to establish one,
137
 and at different levels. It applies to all workers and employers without a dis-
tinction based on occupation or otherwise, unless explicitly provided for under the conventions. 
As such, the provision delimits the scope of the right. The Committee in its decades long of de-
cision-making has demonstrated that the right is extended to employees of both private and pub-
lic sector;
138
 and permanent as well as temporary workers including workers undergoing period 
of work probation.
139
 Moreover, the relevance and application of the right to workers who usual-
ly face difficulties enjoying the right including those working in EPZs have been specifically 
mentioned.
140
 Of course, the two conventions leave Member states to determine the extent to 
which the guarantees recognized under the same are applied to the armed forces and the po-
lice.
141
 As an exception, though, this permissive provision shall be construed restrictively and in 
case of doubt, workers shall be treated as civilians.
142
 On a similar note, the Committee remarks 
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that denying managerial or supervisory employees from joining a workers’ union could only be 
justified if  they are ‘…persons who genuinely represent the interests of employers.143  
  
The other important element of Art.2 (Convention 87) is that the right to form or/and join a trade 
union shall not depend on prior authorization, lest the right would be a ‘dead letter’, as the 
Committee would put it.
144
 However, this does not exempt unions from observing formalities 
concerning publicity or other similar formalities as prescribed by law as far as “…these formali-
ties should not be of such a nature as to impair the free establishment of organizations.”145  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
After the establishment of a union, Freedom of Association translates itself to require that un-
ions are free to draw up their constitutions, elect their leaders and decide their structures and 
programs to further and defend the interests of their respective members.
146
 Understandably, the 
union leaders have an extended protection as their intimidation, demotion, expulsion, or an oth-
erwise harassment hampers the free functioning of unions. The protection not only demands the 
government not to interfere or otherwise obstruct the free formation and functioning of unions, 
but also stands against similar acts of interference by employers over workers and vise versa.
147
  
 
Anti-discrimination clauses, at both individual and union levels, have also made their way to the 
conventions, with workers as the main beneficiaries. As such, workers are protected against 
prejudicial consequences on account of their union membership.
148
 Incidentally, it is worth not-
ing that the realm of the anti discrimination provision is wide enough to cover potential workers 
against making their employment “… subject to the condition that [s] /he shall not join a un-
ion.”149  
 
Non-discrimination among competing unions also is well grounded in the jurisprudence of the 
Committee. However, as an exception and provided that selection is done based on pre-
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established, precise and objective criteria,
150
 some unions can be recognized as ‘most repre-
sentative’ and thereby participate in collective bargaining, consultation and delegation to inter-
national organizations.
151
  
3.5.3.2 Collective Bargaining  
As an essential element of Freedom of Association, collective bargaining basically serves as a 
means whereby workers union/s and employer/s organizations would freely negotiate and agree 
on various terms of employment. The ILO Convention No.98 and its accompanying Recom-
mendation detail its confines and extend the provisions enshrined under Convention No. 87. It 
should be noted, though, that even if unionization is an obvious advantage to have strong collec-
tive bargaining power, nevertheless it is not mandatory as non-unionized employees can also 
bargain in the absence of a union.
152
  
 
The Committee strongly underlines the voluntary nature of negotiations and demands minimal 
state intervention in the process. To this end, compelling the parties to enter into collective bar-
gaining; drafting agreements; and mandatory ministerial approval of agreements are all consid-
ered to run counter to the principle.
153
 Further, the Committee of Experts concluded that “[I]t 
cannot … be deduced from the ILO’s Conventions on collective bargaining that there is a for-
mal obligation to negotiate or to achieve a result (an agreement.)”154 Such an observation that 
truly reveals the voluntary nature of collective bargaining would have a strong ramification on 
the importance of further actions by the parties including strike, as discussed below.    
 
Regarding the scope of collective bargaining, the Committee opted for an extended interpreta-
tion. Among others, it held that “…with the sole possible exception of the armed forces and the 
police and public servants directly engaged in the administration of the State,” all public serv-
ants should enjoy collective bargaining rights.
155
 Further, among the contested areas, which 
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came to the attention of the Committee, explicit ruling has been rendered on the application of 
collective bargaining with regard to the education sector, contract employees, and local embassy 
workers.
156
 Likewise, with the exception of few issues such as those “…which clearly appertain 
primarily or essentially to the management and operation of government business” and educa-
tional policies as such, almost any work related matter could be negotiated by the concerned 
parties.
157
  
3.5.3.3 The Right to Strike  
The right to strike is the third important offspring of Freedom of Association. It is true that ILO 
Conventions and Recommendations do not specifically safeguard the right to strike as attempts 
to codify it in the pillar conventions did not materialize. Some theories are offered explaining 
this failure. The first reason has to do with the prevailing assumption during the conferences 
leading up to the adoption of the pillar conventions that guaranteeing Freedom of Association in 
the conventions was sufficient to secure the right to strike.
158
 Based on this calculation and 
strangely enough, worker representatives thought that “… specifying a right to strike would also 
lead to its restriction”, which led them to also stand against its specific inclusion.159 A second 
and a related theory emanates from differences in details and application of Freedom of Asso-
ciation amongst countries during the 1940’s, which meant that detailed provisions were not wel-
come, including on right to strike.
160
 As a result, every time a proposal was made, the right to 
strike was brought up only in relation to the voluntary conciliation and arbitration procedures.
161
 
 
These challenges albeit, the right to strike is not completely devoid of legal basis. Among oth-
ers, it is mentioned or implied in certain ILO instruments, albeit in passing.
162
 In addition, it is 
also worth noting that the ICSECR,
163
 under some conditions, does recognize the right, as does 
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the European Social Charter.
164
 A recognition of the right is also to be found in ECJ decisions, 
despite allowing some limitations to ensure free market in Europe is not hindered.
165
 
 
However, it is the extensive instruments of the ILO supervisory bodies that now serve as the 
central legal basis for the right to strike. According to the ILO Experts Committee, the right to 
strike can be deduced from Arts.3 and 10 of Convention No.87.
166
 The CFA has  also long con-
sidered the rights as ‘an intrinsic corollary’ to the right to organize given its crucial importance 
with which workers can defend their economic and social interests.
167
 The appropriateness of 
such an inference is, however, contentious.
168
  
 
Against such fallible legal ground, the CFA has detailed the contours of the right. Accordingly, 
the right not only refers to practical work stoppage, but also includes actions like workplace 
occupation and go slow action.
169
 The Committee deems these actions legal up until they cease 
to be peaceful.
170
 Further, the right to strike principally protects workers against legislative or 
other forms of restriction by the government as well as hostile measures of employers against 
striking workers, for instance by hiring replacement workers during such an action. Besides, the 
circumstance under which the right to strike can be legitimately banned is very limited. Accord-
ing to the Committee, prohibition of a strike can only be justified in case of public servants 
“…exercising authority in the name of the State or of workers in essential services in the strict 
sense of the term.” 171  These services are defined as those “...whose interruption could endanger 
the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population.”172  
 
However, despite the efforts of the supervisory bodies, Freedom of Association and the right to 
strike in particular is the most complained about standard and with little consensus. It is stated 
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that in 90 to 98 per cent of cases involving the right, the Committee of Experts found infringe-
ment of Convention No. 87.
173
 It has also been a bone of contention between employers and 
workers in ILO forum,
174
 the former challenging the recognition of the right to strike altogether. 
This was, for instance, evident during the ILO 2013 Conference. Employer representative in the 
Conference Committee ferociously denied that the right to strike can be found in Convention 
No. 87 and that the Committee of Experts has no mandate to provide any interpretation in this 
regard.
175
 Such divergence of stand in the social partners at ILO Conference is also reflected in 
state practices.
176
  
 
Having considered some of the salient manifestation of Freedom of Association, we now pro-
ceed to have a brief look at what surveys reveal about its implementation in EPZs.    
3.5.4 Freedom of Association in EPZs 
As shown above, given the fact that legitimate restrictions on union rights including the right to 
strike are very limited, workers in EPZs are as equally entitled to form or/and join unions, col-
lectively bargain and strike, as other workers. Regarding the right to strike, for instance, the 
strict interpretation that the Committee adopted for a service to qualify as ‘essential’ and thus be 
subject to a justified ban means that industrial action is a legitimate action in EPZs too.
177
  
  
Against this background, it is asserted that Freedom of Association remains to be ‘the most fre-
quent observation made by workers’ organizations178 and have been as a result a ‘rallying-cry’ 
for calling attention to EPZ working conditions.
179
 Both scholars and organized bodies identify 
unionization among the top challenges to implement in EPZs.
180
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The restrictions on the right in EPZs take various forms. While some of them are typical to 
EPZs, others are equally applicable to non-EPZs industries as well. A clear instance of the latter 
is that of China, where all trade unions are by law required to be affiliated to the All China Fed-
eration of Trade Unions that obviously restricts the union rights of workers in EPZs and non 
zones alike.
181
  
  
Focusing on the obstacles distinct to EPZs, three broad forms can be identified, namely legal 
exemption, weak law enforcement, and systematic exclusion. Accordingly, some countries spe-
cifically exempt EPZs from the reach of labour legislations or part thereof.
182
 When this hap-
pens, laws granting inferior labour protection usually follow, Freedom of Association being the 
last thing to include. The scenario can be best exemplified by the case of Bangladesh. Home to 
six big EPZs and against its commitments as a signatory to both conventions, the country ex-
empted all EPZs from the application of labour laws, thus effectively denying Freedom of Asso-
ciation to its more than two million EPZs workers since 1989.
183
 This continued up until 2004 
where, under international pressure,
184
 the government adopted EPZ Workers’ Associations and 
Industrial Relations Act.
185
 However, as a result of an equally strong resistance by the EPZ in-
vestors, the Act only allowed establishment of ‘workers’ representations and welfare commit-
tees’186 instead of recognizing union rights as applied outside the zones. Further, besides the 
stringent legal requirements for their establishment, these committees are time-bounded and 
affiliation with federations beyond the respective zone is prohibited.
187
 Despite some complaints 
to and strongly worded recommendations by the various ILO supervisory organs, the state of 
affairs does not seem to show progress yet. In a recent announcement, the manager of the coun-
try’s EPZ is quoted as saying that they “…do not allow unions, only workers associations."188   
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Similar stories of states submitting to investor pressure are many. For instance, in Malaysia, a 
threat from multinational corporations, which dominate the country’s EPZs, resulted in halting 
an initiative to recognize the right to strike in the electronic sector.
189
 In Namibia, due to pres-
sures from the investors, a compromise meant that unions are allowed, but “strikes and lockouts 
would be outlawed” in EPZs.190 
Reliance on EPZs for countries also wrongly led them to exempt them from labour rights as 
‘essential services’. In Pakistan, EPZ industries are classified as producing ‘essential services’ 
and thus workers are prohibited from taking industrial action,
191
 a clear contravention of the 
strict understanding of ‘essential services’ under ILO. Sri Lanka also provides another instance 
of this model. With a decree ostensibly dubbed as ‘Emergency Regulation’, the entire garment 
export trade was declared as ‘essential service’ thereby preventing the workers engaged in these 
services from exercising the right to strike.
192
 Upon the insistence from the Committee for a 
strict use of the expression ‘essential services’ as illustrated in its cases, the government latter 
notified that the sector has ceased to be so considered as of June 1993.
193
 In the same token, oil 
export zones in the Sudan are exempted from any of the laws allowing trade union rights due to 
their  alleged importance to the economy.
194
 In Togo, regulations pertaining to hiring and firing 
do not apply to EPZs.
195
 
Lastly, it suffices to mention in passing that countries like Zimbabwe, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Nige-
ria, and Colombia
196
 have similar history at a certain point in time. In many instances, stern hos-
tility towards union rights is pushed by EPZ firms with the threat of disinvestment as their 
weapon. As a reminder, the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy provides that special incentives to attract foreign investment, 
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EPZs being a typical case, should not include any limitation of the workers’ Freedom of Associ-
ation and Collectively Bargaining.
197
  
The second way of limiting Freedom of Association in EPZs involves soft application of the 
laws in such a way that they will have no or little effect, even if the general law of the country 
may be formally applicable to EPZs. Reports of such cases in many EPZ hosting countries are 
abundant. Apart from deliberate state acquiesce to anti-union practices in EPZs to appease in-
vestors, the enclave nature of many EPZs, which are generally heavily guarded, worsens the 
work of inspectors as entry is usually made difficult.
198
 At times, the difficulty to access the 
zones is sanctioned by law. For instance, in Nigeria the law states “…no person shall enter into 
a zone without the prior permission from the concerned Authority.”199 This happens, despite the 
fact that Nigeria is signatory to ILO Labour Inspection Convention No.81 that empowers in-
spectors to enter any workplace “…freely and without previous notice.”200 The ILO also notes 
that in Djibouti, not only are EPZs exempt from the competence of inspectors, but the law also 
grants excessive privileges to employers.
201
 Denying entry to trade unions to EPZs, which is all 
common practice,
202
 is still another scheme used.  
Lastly, the composition of EPZ authorities, which oversee the functioning of these zones, is 
worth noting as it feeds the weak enforcement of the laws therein. Studies reveal that these au-
thorities are dominated by officials from some ministry of trade, and “noticeably absent are offi-
cials from labour institutions.”203 Indeed, a brief look at Kenyan,204 Pakistani205 and the pro-
posed Ethiopian EPZ authorities establishment law
206
 reveals the scanty participation of labour 
representatives in an organ that is tasked with administering labour intensive industries. 
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The third modality of encroaching on union rights in EPZs is indeed systematic. It is systematic 
in the sense that the exclusion of workers from the realm of relevant national/local laws safe-
guarding Freedom of Association do not emanate from the laws. Rather, government policies 
are bypassed by manipulating the workforce structure. Accordingly, outsourcing to home work-
ers around the zones who often luck meaningful labour protections including union rights being 
the primary means,
207
 the inclination to choose more women workers has also been associated 
with this motive, as discussed above. As the ILO’s 2008 Global Report puts it, “...use of labour 
through a third party contract concluded by employment agencies and subcontracting of work to 
home-based workers located near the zones also hamper attempts to increase unionization and 
collective bargaining.”208 We can conclude that studies robustly demonstrate a lower degree of 
unionization in EPZs compared to non-EPZ firms  and various forms of methods are in use to 
this effect.   
The fact that many developing countries lack the necessary resources and personnel to regulate 
EPZs
209
 being understandable, many states seem to be giving in to the demands of current or 
potential investors. As Gorden and Turner would put it, “the world has become a huge bazar 
with nations peddling their workforce in competition against one another, offering the lowest 
price for doing businesses.”210  
Two policy contradictions are noted in this regard. First, although contentious, the OECD stud-
ies have come up with a strong argument that any perceived added cost resulting from practicing 
union rights is well outweighed by its favourable impact on workers’ motivation and productivi-
ty.
211
 This suggests that firms pushing against unionization and for inferior labour conditions, in 
general, go counter to their own economic interests. Second, EPZ hosting states that are com-
promising their labour conditions are also committing a policy contradiction.
212
 According to 
Endresen and Jauch, one of the stated aims of EPZs, i.e., creation of jobs and thereby improving 
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the living standard of the population, is being contradicted as a result of inferior labour condi-
tions.
213
  
Despite these and similar tactics used to keep union rights and other labour standards at bay, 
reports show that increased awareness by consumers and interventions from international public 
and worker organizations are helping to reverse the trend and encouraging developments are 
registered, as discussed in the next chapter.  
To sum up, working conditions in EPZs score mixed performance compared to other local firms 
with no zone status. While EPZs fare better on wages, excessive working hours and discrimina-
tory practices on female workers seems evident. Whereas no conclusive trend is drawn on safety 
and health conditions, EZPs tend to provide inferior prospect for the career development of 
workers. Poor rating also prevails on the enforcement of Freedom of Association in EPZs. Last-
ly, what can be observed in many of the instances that show troubling labour conditions in EPZs 
is that the central problem has to do with non application or weak enforcement of laws. Inten-
tional acts of states being visible, it should also be conceded that poor labour conditions in EPZs 
can also sometime well be an extension of the situation in the economy proper and indeed many 
countries luck the required resources to enforce labour laws in EPZs.
214
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4 Chapter Four: The Role of the ILO on Working Conditions in 
EPZs (post 1998)             
Having considered some of the main challenges in the implementation of selected ILO labour 
standards, we now turn to examine the place given to working conditions in EPZs, as a distinct 
subject matter, along the main functions of the ILO. Accordingly, some indicators that help us 
map developments in this regard will be used as far the available data allows. It is, however, 
imperative to first establish the mandate and relevance of the ILO in this regard.   
4.1 ILO Mandate on EPZs Working Conditions                                     
Despite the fact that EPZ workers, as a distinct group of workers, are not specifically addressed 
in ILO laws, establishing the mandate and the relevance of the Organization to engage in EPZ 
labor conditions is not daunting a task.  
 
To begin with, EPZ workers are a concern for the ILO in their simple capacity as workers. This 
is so in the sense that the ILO is tasked with bringing about social justice through improved la-
bour conditions of workers in general.
215
 In addition, EPZs workers are vulnerable, especially in 
relation to some conditions like unionization.
216
  
 
Engagement on EPZ working conditions also bodes well with one of the ILO’s core strategic 
objectives, namely ‘securing full employment’217 as EPZs create considerable jobs, which now 
is estimated around 66 million.
218
  In support of this, the World Commission on the Social Di-
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mension of Globalization specifically underlined the need to take strong action with respect to 
labour conditions in EPZs.
219
  
Besides, the Organization’s ‘solemn obligations’ to “…examine and consider all international 
economic and financial policies and measures … and take measures accordingly”220 can argua-
bly lay a source of the mandate and indeed imposes a duty on the Organization. This is so as the 
very notion of EPZs involves broader international economic policy, i.e., focus on export-based 
economies, and thus warrants ILO’s involvement to help ensure that labour gets some protec-
tion.    
Lastly, the close relationship between trade and labour conditions on the one hand and the fact 
that trading systems like the WTO are shying away from taking labour protection as their con-
cern renew and leaves the ILO’s to remain the dominant actor in this regard.221 The argument is 
predicated on the fact that EPZs are among the top senarios, where the intricate relationship be-
tween trade and labour conditions comes to the fore. Related to this, the fact that hosting coun-
tries are competing for investors by, among others, offering inferior labour protection, makes 
intervention from the ILO crucial so that labour is not left to the mercy of economic players as 
any commodity.  
As a result, the question really should not be if the ILO has a mandate but rather how the man-
date is being carried out, which leads us to inquire the degree of consideration that EPZ workers 
have been given as a distinct group.   
In this regard, records attest that the early 1980s was the time where the ILO began EPZ focused 
works in response to the growing evidences pointing deplorable working conditions in the 
same.
222
 Expectedly, publication of researches and working papers, which lasted until late 1990s 
dominated the early activities.
223
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An important step forward occurred in the fall of 1998 when the ILO convened a Tripartite 
Meeting of EPZs Operating Countries, where representatives
224
 of all the social partners, inter-
national public and non-governmental organizations met for the first time. As the minutes
225
 of 
the meeting reveals, participants explored the contribution of EPZs, social and labour conditions 
therein and suggested some interventions from the ILO. Accordingly, whereas EPZs were as-
sessed positively on their employment generating objectives, complaints regarding excessive 
working hours, union rights difficulties, and discrimination of women workers were rampant. 
Of more significance to the paper were discussions on possible interventions that participants 
demanded from the ILO. Accordingly, there was a sort of consensus that the problem in EPZs 
was that of enforcing existing laws and not a legal lacuna, even if a possible Convention on 
working hours in EPZs was suggested in the early discussions (para.10).
226
 Thus, the meeting 
demanded that there be stronger Freedom of Association guarantees and for inspectors to be 
well equipped and have access to EPZs. They also underlined the significance of ILO’s assis-
tance for states to enforce relevant laws. Also to note is the divergent understanding exhibited 
on the meaning of ‘EPZs’ (para.8). Given the wide participation and the importance of the sub-
ject matters discussed, the meeting is frequently, and indeed rightly, characterized as a defining 
moment in ILO’s concerted engagement on EPZs and for the same reality it is taken as a refer-
ence year for this thesis too. 
4.2 EPZs under the Major Functions of the ILO  
The loosely but broadly crafted objectives and functions of the Organization as enshrined in the 
Constitution reflect its potential stretch and far reaching aspirations. Within the remits of these 
objectives, the ILO has been the principal organ at global level to protect labour for about a cen-
tury now and it does so through its three permanent organs, namely the International Labour 
Conference, the Governing Body, and the International Labour Office. Under this main struc-
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ture, there are, of course, various permanent and ad hoc committees and organs that deal with 
the bulk of the work.                                                 
At this juncture, the tripartite decision making structure, a unique approach to the ILO that does 
not exist in other international organizations,
227
 merits a mention. The approach, which is re-
flected across many of the ILO organs, enables workers’ and employers’ representatives, along 
with government delegates
228
 to get involved in real decision-making processes. Established 
under the belief that “dialogue between workers and employers has a fundamental role to play in 
the development of society”,229 it is usually credited to be the central source of ILO’s legitimacy 
and even longevity.
230
 Primarily, the approach has the potential to balance the bargaining power 
between workers and employers right from the adoption of laws and setting of policies.
231
 This, 
in turn, would help make decisions/standards more acceptable and thus enforceable. It is, how-
ever, criticized for complicating the works of the Organization and its legality under internation-
al law is also questioned.
232
 In addition, the fact that representation in practice is restricted to 
organized workers and employers means that the non/less organized workers in the informal 
sector are excluded from the decision making.
233
 These shortcomings notwithstanding, 
tripartisim is in general taken as the strength of the Organization.    
                                 
With the three-tiered structure and oriented by tripartism, the functions of the Organization re-
volve around three pillars: standard setting, supervision, and technical co-
operation/assistance.
234
 Even if of importance are also conducting researches and publication 
and dissemination of labour related information, below, we discuss the three main functions 
each followed by an assessment of how EPZs play out in the respective areas.  
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4.2.1 ILO Standard Setting  
Standard setting primarily involves the adoption of Conventions and Recommendations by the 
International Labour Conference.
235
 The Conference, where each Member State is represented 
by four delegates - two from the government and the remaining two representing workers and 
employers each - convenes annually.
236
 However, it is the Governing Body, which also reflects 
the tripartite composition,
237
 that mainly draws up agendas for the Conference.
238
 Besides the 
Governing Body, representatives of the social partners and any public international organization 
are eligible to initiate an agenda. (Art.14). It is also noted that international trade union organi-
zations with consultative status at the Organization have also been active in this regard.
239
 This 
said, the cumulative reading of Arts.14 and 16(3) of the Constitution tells us that any agenda 
needs to pass through the Governing Body except where it originates from the Conference itself. 
The agenda may be for standard setting or other actions. In both cases, the International Labour 
Office usually prepares explanatory reports/documents on agenda items as envisaged under 
Art.10 of the Constitution.                                                                             
 
If the agenda is for standard setting and passes objections,
240
 the Conference proceeds to decide 
the form that the proposal shall take – a Convention or Recommendation (Art.19(1)).241 While a 
Convention is binding on member states that have ratified it, Recommendations remain non-
binding and as such are not ratified. Despite such glaring differences, a similar procedure is fol-
lowed in the adoption of Conventions and Recommendations. Principally, they both require two 
third majority vote of delegates present for their adoption (Art.19(2). This way a standard comes 
into being and is afterwards sent to Members for ratification. It should be noted that uncommon 
in other instruments, the Constitution, inventively, imposes on Members to “…bring the Con-
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vention before the authority or authorities within whose competence the matter lies, for the en-
actment of legislation or other action.”242 This being a rough presentation of the core process, in 
reality it involves many correspondences and heated debates on the details and usually takes 
four years to adopt a Conventions or Recommendation.
243
 
 
 These two instruments being the main sources of ILO labour standards, the Conference is also 
the author of the few non-binding declarations, which usually provide formal and authoritative 
policy statements by the Organization.
244
 With a wider application, Declarations are usually 
referred to as ‘informal labour standards.’245 
4.2.2 Place of EPZs under the ILO Standard Setting 
This section seeks to assess how working conditions in EPZs are featured in the ILO standards. 
As such, we pose a question: are EPZ working conditions governed? Here, the search, basically, 
needs to be for a specific ILO legal norm that exclusively deals with EPZ workers as all ILO 
legal standards are normally applicable to all workers unless provided otherwise. This leads us 
to ask a further question - how specific can an ILO standard get? 
 None of the Constitution, the Standing Orders of the Conference or Governing Body provides a 
clue as to what issues can make an agenda for standard setting. It appears that the assent of the 
various organs involved is what really decides the matters, with the Conference having the ulti-
mate authority. This being so, the experience of the ILO shows that specific labour standards 
covering only particular sector of workers are all common. Such instruments are often justified 
in some sort of special circumstances that may relate to the respective workers or/and the activi-
ties they undertake such that a separate instrument becomes necessary. The uniqueness might 
have to do with the nature of the activities that might not fit into standard terms of generalist 
instruments. This was, for instance, one of the reasons for the latest standards on domestic 
workers. It might also emanate from special vulnerabilities that a certain workforce is exposed 
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to for various reasons and thus there is a need to supplement the generally applicable labor 
standers. Migrant workers can be instances in this regard. Other similar reasonable justifica-
tions, as decided by the organs involved in setting the standards, might also factor. 
 
Following a similar line of argument, it will be natural to ask what possible ‘particularity’ may 
justify a possible separate standard on EPZs. Some features and difficulties that are prevalent in 
EPZs like problems of access to the zones, weak application of laws therein in general, long 
hours of work, the difficulties of unionization, over representation of women workers and dis-
criminatory practices thereto and dominant presence of MNEs are the possible candidates that I 
can mention. But as things stand now, the ILO has adopted no specific legal standard on EPZ 
workers.  
    
Which laws then are governing working conditions in EPZs? As noted above, the generalist 
Conventions and Recommendations, Declarations and observations of the different supervisory 
committees, as appropriate, apply to all workers including those in EPZs. Admittedly, those 
standards that are poorly enforced in EPZs are naturally more relevant than others. In addition, 
two of the ILO Declarations are also cited as particularly relevant to EPZs, namely the 1998 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and the Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy. 
 
The importance of the first Declaration lies in that many EPZ operating countries are not parties 
to many of Conventions constituting the four core principles and rights.
246
 The Declaration fills 
the gap as it requires all Member States to respect, promote and realize the fundamental Con-
ventions, regardless of whether they are parties or not. As a result, these states are supposed to 
annually report on developments related to the implementation of the relevant fundamental con-
ventions that they did not ratify. It is asserted that “they are also required to report specifically 
on the observance of these principles in EPZs.”247 In this regard, it is worth mentioning that this 
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reporting obligation has a backing under the Art.19(5(e) of the Constitution
248
 that provides for 
the possibility of requesting reports on un-ratified Conventions. Even if the provision applies to 
all Conventions, the fact that there is no set pattern for reviewing under this provision justifies 
the well regulated follow up procedure of the Declaration. What is more, Freedom of Associa-
tion and principle against discrimination, the two most poorly enforced areas in EPZs, are part 
of the Declaration and thus reinforces its relevance to EPZ workers. 
 
The Declaration on Multinational Enterprises has also particular relevance to EPZs as the MNEs 
are the major players in EPZs. Among others, it provides, ‘[m]ultinational enterprises should 
observe standards of industrial relations not less favourable than those observed by comparable 
employers in the country concerned.”249 Through the periodic surveys on the implementation of 
the Declaration, it identifies challenges and suggests interventions. Thus, it is considered as an 
additional tool for the betterment of working conditions in EPZs. Lastly, despite the relevance of 
the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for Fair Globalization to EPZs, as a recent phenomenon, 
it is only taken lightly here.     
 
This being the state of the laws by now, there have been some attempts to specifically regulate 
working conditions in EPZs. For instance, during the 1998 Tripartite Meeting, it was suggested 
that the ILO formulate a new Convention regarding working hours in EPZs,
250
 even if it was not 
pursued. More recently, some developments are emerging that may eventually give rise to a 
separate standard on EPZs. Accordingly, after discussions of policy documents in 2003 and ear-
ly 2008, the Governing Body decided in its November 2008 meeting on the possibility of gen-
eral discussion on EPZs by the Conference. Following this, the Body’s November 2011 meeting 
saw ‘decent work in EPZs’ among the last seven candidate items to make to the 2013 Confer-
ence.
251
 However, further meetings of the Governing Body prioritized other themes and EPZs 
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does not yet see the light of the day. As things stand now, the Governing Body will decide in 
November 2013 whether to place the topic to the 2015 International Conference.
252
 
 
Even hoping that it will be so placed, it should be noted that the agenda, as it stands now, is not 
necessarily for a standard setting, but only for general discussion. Meaning, even if it is accepted 
by the Conference as an agenda, standard setting is only one of the possible outcomes as the 
Conference has many other options to pick from. Among others, adopting a resolution, request-
ing more information and further studies, or completely postponing without deliberation or else 
dropping the issue are all possibilities.  
 
This said, some points can be added to highlight why it is less probable for a standard to emerge 
in the area in the near future. First, the overall recent trend at the ILO reveal that there is a little 
taste for new standards. Concerns about less ratification rates and weak implementation partly 
explain the decrease in the production of standards.
253
 For instance, the yearly average 2.23 
Conventions between 1946 -1996 has decreased to less than 1.00 between 1996 to date. Indeed, 
the ILO has been under attack for many of its ‘too detailed’ ‘un-ratifiable’ Conventions, many 
of them concerning ‘specific sectors of workers.’254 As a result, many instruments were shelved 
as obsolete ones and many others withdrawn as receiving little acceptance.
255
 As the 1997 Re-
port of the Director-General, who took up the issue of standard setting at length, reveals a fewer 
and targeted instruments with the highest ‘added value’ is the policy and standard setting should 
be a last resort.
256
 Related to this, the adoption of the 1998 Declaration with a shift in focus to 
few ‘core’ areas strengthens the argument.  
 
Second, the fact that the usual complaints in EPZs have to do with weak or non-enforcement of 
existing laws makes new standards less appealing. Added to this is the fact that, as discussed 
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above, in comparison to the conditions outside the zones, EPZs do not always fare badly to de-
mand a different legal norm.  
 
Still, a technical barrier for a possible adoption of new standards in this regard can also be iden-
tified – challenge of devising an appropriate definition for ‘EPZs’257 in such way that it can be 
implemented with some degree of legal certainty. For instance, the 2004 ILO Global Report runs in 
part “ as definitions can differ, there is some question as to the extent to which China’s special zones fit 
into the EPZ category.” Admittedly, the same issue can be asked now as Members are reporting 
on working conditions in their ‘EPZs’. However, unlike the current situation where reports are 
related to a certain Convention and EPZs are only one of the possible issues to report about, the 
adoption of a new instrument on EPZs would make the issue very concrete as it will decide 
whether to report or not after all.  
 
Lastly, even if specific laws were to be adopted, difficulties with ratification is bound to surface 
as countries are competing for investment with inferior labour standards still a playing card.    
 
In summary, despite all challenges and regardless of the possible outcomes of recent develop-
ments, it can be argued that the attempts to place EPZs as an agenda before the Conference, the 
highest organ in ILO, represent one of the bold actions concerning working conditions in EPZs 
from the ILO.  
4.2.3  Supervision/Monitoring under the ILO 
Supervision of Labour standards, the other main task of the Organization, mainly involves a 
regular system of examining reports and a ‘special procedure’ based on complaints. The sepa-
rate supervision system for Freedom of Association issues can fall under the latter category.  
To begin with reporting, Member States are obliged to report on the implementation of ratified 
Conventions as per Art.22 of the Constitution on different intervals. These reports are made ac-
cording to the forms that the Governing Body prepares. The reports are first examined by the 
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Committee of Experts, a Governing Body organ of 20 experts working on their personal capaci-
ty.
258
 While the Committee of Expert makes what is referred to as a ‘direct request’ on minor 
and technical misgivings, ‘observation’ is recorded in case of serious infringement. The first is 
sent to the concerned Member and the workers’ and employers’ organization from the same 
country for correction or additional information whereas observations are in addition published 
in the Committee’s annual reports to the Conference.259  
 
The Committee of Experts may also identify some grave contraventions and pass it over to the 
Conference Committee on the Application of Standards for further follow up.
260
 This latter 
Committee is a tripartite organ constituted by the Conference as per Art.7(1) of the Constitution. 
The proceedings of the Conference Committee provide an opportunity for the representatives of 
the concerned government to explain on issues of concern before it makes a report to the plenary 
of the International Conference for adoption.  
 
The reporting mechanism, as briefly described above, being the main supervisory mechanism, it 
is supplemented by the complaint procedures. Accordingly, Art.24 allows any employer or 
workers organization at any level to bring a complaint, called ‘representation’, alleging a Mem-
ber State has failed to secure effective observance of a Convention it has ratified. The Govern-
ing Body, in such cases, forms a tripartite committee to examine the case. If this committee is 
not satisfied with the explanation, if any, of the member on the representation lodged, it publish-
es the representation, government’s replies (if any) as well as its views. It may also refer the 
case to the Committee of Experts and Conference Committees for further examination and in-
terventions. 
 
 In addition, the Constitution provides a rarely used
261
 interstate complaint mechanism under 
Art.26, where allegations of non-compliance with a ratified Convention can be brought by a 
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Member State that has itself ratified the Convention in question or delegates of the Conference, 
or else the Governing Body on its own. This may lead to the establishment of a Commission of 
Inquiry, the highest ILO investigative body, and ultimately to a possible action, which may be 
deemed important to secure complaisance as envisaged under Art.33 as was the case for Myan-
mar in 2000.  
 
Still on supervision, some words are in order concerning the special procedure related to Free-
dom of Association, a topic in focus. As discussed previously, this system stands out from the 
other special procedures on some grounds. First, it is not clearly provided for under the Consti-
tution. It was rather devised by ILO/UN consultation as of necessity in 1951 after the enactment 
of Convention No.87. Second, unlike the other organs, it entertains complaints against any 
Member State regardless of whether it has ratified the Freedom of Association related conven-
tions at hand or not,
262
 a procedure the constitutionality of which has been intensively chal-
lenged in the past. Lastly, the combination of representation and expertise in the composition of 
the Committee is a plus. This is effected by appointing an independent  expert chairperson while 
the rest represent the three social partners. Similar to that of a complaint system under Art.26, 
the Committee may in exceptional circumstances refer a recommendation to the Fact Finding 
and Conciliatory Commission, an ad hoc body of experts appointed by the Governing Body. It 
seems that such broad based standing and vast potential of respondents (all State Members) has 
helped it to examine more than 2300 cases that makes it the single most source of authority on 
Freedom of Association.  
 
It should be noted that the various Declarations are also supervised through reporting. For in-
stance, the Global Report analyzes one of the fundamental rights in the 1998 Declaration each 
year.
263
 So far, four such reports are produced on Freedom of Association and collective bar-
gaining, i.e., 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012. In addition, the same Declaration also requires an An-
nual Review be prepared, where the implementation of un-ratified Conventions pertaining to the 
four areas is assessed. In a similar fashion, the Declaration on MNEs is also surveyed in four 
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years interval and extensive information is collected from governments, MNEs, workers’ and 
employers’ organizations.  
4.2.4  ILO Supervision and EPZs Working Conditions 
In order to examine developments in relation to EPZ working conditions in the monitoring sys-
tem of the ILO, I have used two indicators: whether reference is made to EPZ in the reporting 
forms or not and the number of ‘observations’ made by the Committee of Experts and that of the 
Conference Committee on issues related to working conditions in EPZs.  Here, it should be un-
derlined that ‘EPZs’ is recognized as a standard expression in ILO documents and have been 
used as a search key.      
The inclusion or not in the reporting forms of a reference to EPZs is arguably an appropriate 
indicator since the information so requested is the basis for the reporting system. It also sheds 
light as to how their distinctive features is noted in the reporting system.  
 
With this conviction, I made a review of the reporting forms
264
 for all the eight fundamental 
Conventions as well as three other selected Conventions based on their relevance to working 
conditions in EPZs, namely, Convention No.187 (2006) (Occupational Safety and Health), La-
bour Inspection Convention No 81 (1947), and Hours of Work Convention No.1 (1919). Ac-
cordingly, none of them contain a reference to EPZ. It would mean, among other things, that 
EPZ hosting Members would address the issue of EPZs in their own initiation unless they have 
been so required by the supervisory organs.   
 
On the other hand, the reporting forms
265
 on Freedom of Association and elimination of discrim-
ination for the Annual Report on un-ratified conventions as a Follow Up to the 1998 Declaration 
makes specific reference to EPZs. For instance, one of the questions asks whether the right to 
collective bargaining can be exercised with regard to, among others ‘workers in export pro-
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cessing zones (EPZs) or enterprises/industries with EPZ status.’266 Incidentally, the absence of 
reference to EPZs in the report forms pertaining to child and forced labour areas is reflective of 
the fact that unionization hurdles and incidents of discrimination are more severe in EPZs to 
secure a specific mention.  
 
The same trend follows on the reporting forms for the Global Reports.
267
 Accordingly, in all 
three of the accessible reports on Freedom of Association and Effective Recognition of Collec-
tive Bargaining for 2000,2004 and 2008, EPZ workers are identified among the specific groups 
facing barriers to organize. Manifestations of the challenges and some instances of success sto-
ries and future activities are discussed.  
 
Lastly, a stark difference is noted on the reporting forms/questionnaires for the MNEs Declara-
tion. While the form used for the eighth survey that came out in 2003 posed a specific question 
on working conditions in EPZs,
268
 the questionnaires preceding it did not.  
 
The number of observations by the Committee of Experts in relation to EPZs, available in 
NORMLEX, an ILO searching system, also throws some light on the growing presence of the 
subject matter on the supervision machinery. Accordingly, whereas 38 observations were made 
between 1990 to 1997, the number grew to 51 during the years 1999 to 2003. Moreover, 140 
observations are entered from 2004 to 2011. Some hypothesis can be made on the surge in ob-
servations. The rising number of EPZs and the number of countries ratifying relevant conven-
tions can be among the possible explanations. The increasing visibility of the subject matter 
after the 1998 meeting is also another factor with the capacity to affect the result. Moreover, it 
can also be argued that the ILO’s awareness creation and assistance should have something to 
contribute to the surge.  
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Substance wise, the complaints reveal a wide array of challenges that EPZ workers are facing, 
many of which relating to union rights. For instance, the report of the Committee of Experts’ to 
the 2013 Conference covers cases like killing of union leaders and firing of workers for practic-
ing union rights in Bangladesh;
269
 delay in the enforcement of laws pertaining to EPZ workers 
in Pakistan (p.135); allegations of replacing trade unions with non independent company unions 
in the Philippines (p.148); difficulties of EPZs trade unions to meaningfully participate in col-
lective bargaining in Sri Lanka (p.171); exemption of EPZs from union rights laws in the Sudan 
(p.172); non recognition of trade unions in Swaziland (p.175); and denial of access to the zones 
to inspectors in  Djibouti (p.561).  
Notable in these cases is the thoroughness of the discussion and specificity of demands by the 
experts. What is more, the Committee of Experts, excepting for Bangladesh whose case was 
referred to the Conference Committee for further information,
270
 welcomes some developments 
in the countries mentioned. This was especially so with Nigeria for the commencement of un-
ionization in its EPZs.
271
 It is also encouraging to note that many of them have provided the in-
formation the experts requested earlier. Besides, the experts do not spare a chance to offer tech-
nical assistance in as many occasions. 
It is of interest to note that the same Committee has earlier noted with satisfaction that a Namib-
ian law that had prohibited industrial action in Namibia has lapsed.
272
 Similar favourable devel-
opments are also recorded in Turkey, Sri Lanka and Dominican Republic.
273
 
A similar increase in the number of cases reaching the Conference Committee over time is also 
discernible. Accordingly, data from NORMLEX shows that the Conference Committee has ad-
dressed some 68 cases involving EPZ working conditions since 1988. The number grew from 29 
during the period of 1990 to 2000 to 39 in the last decade ending 2011. This, among others, 
points to the existence of serious violations, as the Conference Committee only examines few 
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but serious cases. It is of interest to note that more than half of these cases involve either or both 
of the Conventions on Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining.  
 
Lastly, the number of cases handled by the Committee on Freedom of Association, too, being on 
the rise, what is distinct with its conclusions is the way they minutely follow up the efforts given 
to its recommendations up until the closure of the case. Equally important to notice is the fact 
that cases sometimes stay active for over a decade with the Committee seizing the matter.
274
  
4.2.5 Technical Cooperation/Assistance 
Lastly, an area that may help us examine ILO’s intervention on working conditions in EPZs is 
what is usually referred to as technical assistance or cooperation. This function, which defies 
any single description, can be traced to Art.10 (2 (b)) of the Constitution. The provision obliges 
the International Labour Office, among others to “ accord to governments at their request all 
appropriate assistance within its power in connection with the framing of laws and regulations 
on the basis of the decisions of the Conference and the improvement of administrative practices 
and systems of inspection” under the guidance of the Governing Body.  
Thus, the assistance keeps Members’ needs at its center and seems to cover a wide range of ac-
tivities as ‘administration’, under Art.10, might mean a lot. As one of the permanent agendas for 
the Conference (Agenda 6), it is claimed that technical cooperation programs normally consume 
over half of the ILO’s annual Budget and cover activities in some 140 countries.275 The ILO 
uses a network of regional, area and branch offices in more than 40 countries to implement the 
various technical assistance and thereby “has visible and active presence within those Member 
states in most need of its support and expertise.”276 It usually involves other International Or-
ganizations like the UN, World Bank, IMF and others in running these programs. Leaving aside 
the details of its execution, suffices to state here that technical assistance/cooperation programs 
have a wide reach and are meant to help states in advancing labour and social rights.  
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The adoption of the 1998 Declaration and its emphasis on promoting standards gives technical 
assistance a prominent role to play. The Declaration, under Art.3, makes this clear in that need-
based support of the ILO is the principal way of executing the obligations that the Members 
assumed under the Declaration. In line with this, more than 50% of the ILO technical assistance 
relates to the implementation of the four core labour standards in recent years.
277
 The ILO Dec-
laration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, also specifically refer to ‘technical assistance 
and expert advice’ as a tool to achieve its objectives.278 It, therefore, becomes relevant to exam-
ine how EPZs play out in the technical assistance programs of the ILO. 
4.2.6 EPZs under ILO Technical Assistance 
Various reports point to ILO’s technical assistance involvements on EPZ working conditions. 
These include many of the Global reports as well as other ILO documents prepared exclusively 
for EPZs initiatives. For instance, a 2003 ILO report
279
 lists illustrative technical cooperation 
and advisory services with respect to EPZs. Many of them are meetings and trainings given to 
the social partners from EPZ hosting countries from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle 
East. 
There has also been distinct and large-scale technical cooperation programs, which are meant to 
improve various aspects of labour conditions in EPZs. In 2009 for instance, the ILO started a 
technical cooperation project named “Promoting Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work in 
Sri Lanka”280 The project was initiated after repeated comments from the ILO Committees, 
where “many of these comments were focused on anti-union practices in Export Processing 
Zones” therein.281 Accordingly, the project, which stayed for two years, had the improvement of 
working conditions in EPZs as one of its core objectives. Another technical cooperation on Jor-
dan’s’ Industrial zones is also to be mentioned.    
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Moreover, in the Medium Strategic Framework (2010-2015) that the ILO adopted, EPZs are 
given a separate entry, where the Organization, among others, aims to take significant actions to 
introduce union right in EPZs in six countries in the span of five years.
282
 It, furthermore, as-
pires to help, at least 18 countries, implementation Freedom of Association and collective bar-
gaining rights, including in EPZs by 2015.”283 These are indicative instances as establishing a 
trend is not forthcoming mainly due to the diverse forms that such assistances take, making 
search for progressive developments daunting.   
 
Lastly, my research into the budget and programs of the ILO from 2000/1 onwards reveals that 
it was only since the budget years of 2004/5 that EPZs has got a specific mentioning, which 
shows the progressive prominence that they have obtained in the works of the ILO. Of special 
importance was the Program and Budget for Biennium 2006/7, where an Infocus Initiative on 
EPZs was put in place with a budget of USD 200,000 that eventually resulted in more studies 
and a database on the area.
284
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5 Conclusion  
For some decades now, export oriented economic policies have taken root as a feasible option 
for many countries. To this effect, a scheme by the name Export Processing Zone(s) was de-
vised, where investors engaged on selected produces mainly destined for export are granted with 
generous incentives of fiscal and other forms. Ostensibly, labour has also been among these in-
centives.  
Typically supervised by a separate governmental authority, EPZs aim, among others, at creating 
jobs, facilitating transfer of technology, and boosting foreign earnings. Noble as these objectives 
may be, challenges remain in turning them into reality, and especially so in relation to the quali-
ty of jobs EPZs offer. Surveys, which usually compare working conditions in EPZs with that of 
similar local firms with no zone status, demonstrate that while EPZs provide a better wage, long 
hours of work and hostility towards union rights are prevalent. Of equal concern has also been 
alleged discriminatory practices against female works who still dominate the workforce in 
EPZs. Moreover, what transpires from many of the findings of inferior labour conditions in 
EPZs is that the main challenge remains lack of implementing existing laws.  
 
As much as states bear the prime responsibility to ensure a decent work, the ILO occupies a spe-
cial place at a global level and EPZ workers, as any group of workers, falls within its compe-
tence. The facts that EPZs hire considerable workforce and that competition among countries in 
a bid to attract investors by offering inferior labor conditions is putting workers in a precarious 
situation, reinforce ILO’s legitimacy to get involved in the area.  
 
In line with this, the Organization has been undertaking some activities pertaining to working 
conditions in EPZs from the early 1980s. From undertaking a series of research works during 
the first two decades, it went to convene a tripartite meeting in 1998, where social partners from 
EPZs hosting countries discussed important aspect of EPZ working conditions. 
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From this time on, visibility of EPZs in ILO activities increased. Among others, discussions in 
the Governing Body that lastly led to attempts of tabling ‘working conditions in EPZs’ as an 
agenda for the Conference, the highest body in ILO, is a notable development. Even if the ta-
bling did not happen as of yet, it, however, symbolizes an important leap on the area as it might 
eventually lead to a separate standard or, at least, some other positive interventions. On the pos-
sibility of a standard for EPZ workers, however, I demonstrated that chances are slim. Among 
others, the facts that there is low appetite for new and specific standards in the ILO; that EPZs 
do not always perform bad, and indeed they fare better in some working conditions; and, most 
importantly, that the chief challenge in trying to ensure better working conditions in EPZs re-
mains to be implementing existing laws and not that of legal lacuna, support the less likelihood 
of a new instrument.  
 
On the supervisory function as well, progressive visibility of EPZ is discernible. The issue of 
working conditions in EPZs is making its way into report forms of many instruments. This is 
especially so for the follow up procedures of the 1998 Declaration, which prominently pertains 
to, among others, Freedom of Association  and non-discrimination rights, the two most troubled 
rights in EPZs. The same holds true for the MNEs Declaration. However, all the sample report 
forms for ILO conventions that I used do not make a reference to EPZs. It appears that it is left 
to the initiation of the reporting member state and most importantly to the active and increasing-
ly thorough observations and demands of, mainly, the Committee of Experts and the CFA. In 
this regard, I have shown that there is an evident increase in the number of observations on 
EPZs from the Committee of Experts and the Conference Committee. The same trend of incre-
ment of cases was also demonstrated with the CFA, according to the data from NORMLEX, an 
ILO searching system, which duly recognizes ‘EPZs’ as a standard expression.   
 
Technical assistance, which is becoming an increasingly important tool to help enforce labour 
standards, is very relevant to working conditions in EPZs. This is so as some hosting states do 
not have the needed skills and resource to enforce their laws in EPZs, where big multinationals 
dominate. In this regard, even if data which can help us map the trend was not forthcoming, re-
cent EPZ focused projects point to meaningful intervention from the ILO. The fact that a sepa-
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rate entry is made on EPZs in the budget plans of the ILO since 2004/5 is yet another strong 
indicator of EPZs’ increasing visibility in the works of the Organization.  
 
This said, challenges remain. It was demonstrated that violations of labour right in EPZs contin-
ued unabated. Whereas many of the infringements are special to EPZs, some of them are an ex-
tension of the problems in the economy proper. On the former, exemption of EPZs from the 
purview of labour laws and deliberate non or weak enforcement of laws are the principal tools 
countries are utilizing to retain and attract more investment. As such, incidents of denial to in-
spectors and union leaders of access to closed type zones, firing striking workers, non-
recognition of unions, inferior conditions for women workers, and attacks on union leaders are 
among the top complaints lodged.  
 
Nonetheless, some recent developments have thrown some glimpse of hope towards improve-
ments in these conditions. Regarding this, the ILO has noted some countries abolishing hostile 
laws, the recognition of unions in some EPZs, and increased tripartite dialogues with the help of 
ILO’s  assistance are some of the notables. Lastly, it would be safe to conclude that growing 
ILO’s involvement in EPZs working conditions is visible in many aspects, and the Organization 
is expected, and indeed advised, to remain seized of the matter, mainly through supervision and 
targeted technical assistance.     
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